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Modernization

Yugoslavia: Modernization in
an Ethnicallv Diverse State
JOEL M. HALPERN
T H E Belgrade-SarajevoExpress usually does not stop in the small Bosu,a,,
town of Maglaj, but passengers looking out the window cannot fail to
notice the paper-products factory. Its huge chimneys belching acrid smoke
repeat the form of the medieval fortress towers on a nearby wooded hill
and the soaring minarets of mosques clustered below. The train passes
through Maglaj as the factory shifts are changing, and off-duty workers in
blue cotton jackets with the factory name Natronka embroidered on the
breast pocket wait with their bicycles at the railroad crossing while the
Express goes by.
Many of them live in the adjacent Moslem villages. Others pedal a few
miles further into town. For those who come from Orthodox villages in
the surrounding hills, the long trip home is made only over Sundays. They
take a road along the River Bosna to the point where a bridge connects
the old and new parts of town. The Old Town is dominated by an impressive mosque (soon to be registered as a cultural monument intended
for state preservation). Steep, winding streets converge on a compact,
cobbled marketplace rimmed by wooden stalls and shops that give the twodimensional effect of a stage set. On market days the place is thronged with
villagers from various ethnic groups who have come in from the countryside, each group readily identifiable by its distinctive dress. Ironware
Material in this article is based in part on research carried out in Yugoslavia in
1961-1962 and 1964 under grants from the National Science Foundation and the
Department of State. It also draws on data from the author's 'Yugoslav Peasant
Society in Transition: Stability in Change" (Anthropological Quarterly, July
1g63), "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia" (Human Organization,
Summer 1965). and A Serbian Village (Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1967).
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wrought by itinerant Gypsy smiths is displayed on the cobbles alongside
peasant baskets of h i t or spice-sellers' mounds of brick-red ground paprika. At an outdoor coffeehouse overhanging the river, men in fezzes sit
with their pipes and small cups of thick Turkish coffee and contemplate
the water. The river is now polluted by wastes from a large steel mill upstream, and the slightest breeze carries sulfurous fumes from the paper
factory.
The factory smell is even stronger in the flat New Town across the river,
where an ordered grid settlement has been laid out within the past fifteen
years. Here are rows of modern workers' flats, district administrative offices,
a new school, a fine soccer field, a health station, a bank, and modern shops,
including a new supermarket frequented with curiosity and trepidation by
village women. Here, too, is the Orthodox church and smaller Catholic
church. The center of activity on the new side is the so-called workers'
University, with meeting rooms and movie hall, and the adjacent hotel and
cafe, where the specialty of the house is young lamb roasted whole on an
outdoor spit. From this vantage point, town officials sit in the evening and
look out across the Bosna to the silhouette of the fortress towers, speculating on how tourism might be induced if they were to dramatize the ancient
architecture with colored spotlights.
Maglaj exemplifies the Yugoslav modernization process in miniature:
ethnic diversity, small medieval and modern urban complexes side by
side, state ownership and private enterprise, and the omnipresent advantages and disadvantages of industrialization in a small town.
It is important at the outset to distinguish modernization from social
and cultural change, particularly as it applies to Yugoslavia. Modernization, as defined in this chapter, is the specific process of social and cultural
change associated with the development of an industrialized economy.
Thus the changes associated with phenomena such as population migrations, the development of towns, changes in religious value systems, occupational specialization, and centralized states need not be and indeed
have not been in the past history of the Balkans linked with the process of
modernization. Modernization is not to be thought of as a time of great
change associated with an earlier period of minimal change. For example,
during the period of the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, there were large
population movements, mostly into mountain refuge areas. As Turkish
influence waned in the early nineteenth century, many people began to
emerge from the mountains and take up life in valley and plains areas,
often by clearing the forest. This transition from a pastoral to a mixed
farming economy may not seem as dramatic a transformation to us as the
rising of mighty industrial complexes today, but surely it made a great
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impact on the individuals involved. Government intervention in the lives
of individuals is not new. I n areas such as Croatia and Dalmatia, even
before the onset of the industrial revolution, the government was assessing
taxes by measuring the size of houses and the square area of each of the
rooms in a village house.
What is new in Yugoslavia, as in the rest of the world, is the totality,
universality, and irreversibility of the process. Modernization is more than
simply a matter of universalizing tractors and electric lights in the villages,
and factories and apartment houses in the towns. It is more than extending
government services in health, education, and welfare to all. These are, of
course, parts of the process, and Yugoslavia, as a modern state and, more
specifically, a Communist state committed to an intensive program of industrialization, takes particular pride in the increase in the quantitative
indices of modernization, whether they be a greater steel output or an
increase in literacy. There are, however, other more subtle and more important problems of concern to those interested in the evolution of civilizations. This discussion will focus specifically on the effects of modernization on the village and town and upon subsequently changing social
patterns.

Demographic, Economic, and Ethnic Background
A look at settlement and occupation patterns is basic to an understanding
of what is happening in Yugoslavia. There are eight cities with a population of ioo,ooo or more, and these centers contain only g percent of the
country's population (1961). With the exception of Albania this distribution is the lowest in Europe. There are seven cities over 50,000 but under
ioo,ooo with 2.8 percent of the population. Over 77 percent of the people
live in communities of io,ooo or less (the highest rate in Europe, again
with the exception of Albania, which has 78.8 percent in this category).
T h e town of Maglaj is among these latter communities. I n spite of this
pattern of population distribution, Yugoslavia surpasses in per capita industrial output countries such as Italy, Chile, Japan, and Argentina, which
have proportionately much greater urban concentrations.1
While a significant concentration of industry is in the capital cities of
the republics, particularly in and around Belgrade and Zagreb, much industry is located in small towns. Examples are the main steel-producing
centers of Zenica (population, 44,184). Sisak (26,647),Jasenice (15,726), and
NiUiC (20,166), which are located in four of the six constituent republics
Zenica alone produces more than half the total Yugoslav
of Yugo~lavia.~
raw steel and 60 percent of its pig iron and coke. Yet even here peasant
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farms cover the slopes of the hills that encircle the mills, and a rural setting surrounds the grime and smells of the steel town.
I n Belgrade, rapidly expanding suburbs on both sides of the Danube
are beginning to obscure the countryside. Still, from any point in the
capital city it is only a few minutes' drive to the lime whitewashed villages
of the Vojvodina plains or to the scattered tile-roofed cottages in the hills
of Sumadija-except, of course, when there is a traffic jam. The close relationship to the countryside is a very real thing. About half of Yugoslavia's industrial workers live in rural areas and commute, often long
distances. As of 1960, approximately 48 percent of rural income was derived from nonagricultural work.3 Out of a total population of almost
18,500,ooo for that year, over 12,500,000 are listed as residing on agricultural holdings of some sort. Of these, more than 2,500,000 are active males,
over half of whom have employment of some kind outside the farm.4 The
total working force in manufacturing is listed as 1,074,ooo; 2,272,000 are
engaged in economic production of all sorts.5 Almost a third of all private
agricultural holdings have someone employed full time off the land. These
workers do not by any means come only from dwarf holdings; more than
25 percent of them live on farms of four hectares or over, and, as Table 1
indicates, the so-called mixed (peasant-worker) households possess almost
one third of all agricultural land.
I n Yugoslavia the average household size is 4.0 (compared with 3.1 for
the United Kingdom, 2.8 for Sweden, 3.9 for Portugal). Approximately one
.~
third of the population lives in households of six or more p e ~ p l eYugoslavia, then, is a country of people living mainly on farms or in small towns
and in relatively large family units, with variations, of course, according
to geography and ethnic makeup.
There has also been substantial growth in the index of industrial production, from 172 in 1950 (1939 is calculated as loo) to 391 in 1959.~I n
1936, of the total of 741,713 individuals listed as wage earners, only 374,170
were workers in industry. I n 1921, 76 percent of all household heads were
farmers, and l o percent were listed as workers.8 What appears to be a low
degree of urbanization actually represents a relatively great increase over
the past several decades. Table 2 summarizes the approximately fourfold
increase in size in most of the main cities in as many decades. Given the
small size of cities in prewar Yugoslavia, it is apparent that the overwhelming majority of the present working force resident in cities today has fairly
recently come from villages. From 1949 to 1960, some 2,162,000 people
left their villages? The extremely crowded housing conditions found in all
Yugoslav urban areas, originally due largely to wartime destruction but
today mainly the result of migration, have resulted in the building of pri-
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vate homes on the outskirts and in some cases the Yugoslav equivalent of
shanty towns where it is possible to maintain rural habits to a greater extent than in modern apartment buildings. These factors constitute some
of the critical demographic and economic variables in the process of social
change in Yugoslavia.
Returning to Maglaj for a moment, another variable is apparent: the
ethnic differences symbolized by the mosques and churches in close proximity but in separate quarters of the small town. The very name of this
multinational state means Land of the South Slavs. I n six republics covering an area of 98,740 square miles, or approximately the size of Wyoming,
existing national differences are explicitly recognized by the government.
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are, in that order, largest in
size and population; Macedonia is larger in area but slightly smaller in
population than Slovenia, and Montenegro is smallest both in area and
population. The geographic position of Yugoslavia, bordering on Italy,
Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic
Sea, helps to explain the widely varying influences, from Rome and Byzantium to the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires, and, since 1948,
between Eastern and Western blocs, to which Yugoslavia has been subject
throughout her turbulent history.
There is enormous variety in terrain, ranging from that of the coastal
strip with its Mediterranean climate and vegetation to the continental
Pannonian basin. Yugoslavia is to a considerable extent a mountainous
country, but almost a third of its territory is less than 600 feet above sea
level. Twenty-five percent lies between 600 and 1,500 feet. There are a
number of important lowlands along the middle Danube and areas of
broad valleys between hills and mountains in Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia,
and Croatia. About 25 percent of the land is over 3,000 feet. Forming the
backbone of Yugoslavia are the craggy limestone ridges paralleling the
coast, which at best support scattered herding. T h e Julian Alps in Slovenia
and the mountains extending further inland through Bosnia support
mixed economies with herding and forestry predominant. There are striking differences such as between the karst and mountains of Montenegro,
where only I I percent of the land is arable, and the flat and fertile Vojvodina where 86 percent is arable. The dairy herds on Slovenia's alpine meadows strongly contrast with water buffalo in the rice fields of Macedonia.
Serbia has two autonomous areas: the Vojvodina which contains Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Romanian minority groups among others,
and Kossovo-Metohija, known as the Kosmet, which is populated mainly
by Albanians, most of whom are Moslems. T h e Serbs proper, Montenegrins, and most Macedonians are Orthodox. The Slovenes and Croats
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are Catholic. Most Yugoslav Moslems live in Bosnia, and significant Albanian and Turkish Moslem groups are found in Macedonia. According
to the 1953 census, there were approximately 2,000,000 Moslems in all of
Yugoslavia, as compared with more than 5,000,000 Catholics, 7,000,ooo
Orthodox, and 2,000,000 listed without affiliation.
Slovenes and Croats use the Latin alphabet; Serbs, Macedonians, and
Montenegrins use the Cyrillic. Bosnia, with its central position and mixed
population of the three major groups, employs both. Slovene and Macedonian are separate Slav languages, the former largely unintelligible to
speakers of Serbo-Croatian, the main language of Yugoslavia. Aside from
differences in alphabets, there are a number of vocabulary and accent differences between Serbian and Croatian but no real problem in mutual
comprehension.
Official ethnic distinctions for census purposes tend to confuse more than
to clarify. For example, in the 1931 census the term "Yugoslav" was employed for both Serbs and Croats, but this forced superficial unity was
subsequently dropped, and in the postwar period the designations of the
newly formed republics (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
were used. Serbs and Montenegrins have a common heritage, and contemporary differences are based in large part on specific ecological adaptations to open-field agriculture as opposed to a primarily pastoral economy.
Some Montenegrins migrated to more fertile lowlands in Serbia and Bosnia
after the Turkish withdrawal and thus became the ancestors of many now
classified as Serbs. I n the prewar Serb-dominated government, Macedonia
was referred to as South Serbia, and today's Macedonians are mainly
oriented toward Serbia. I n Bosnia, Catholics generally declare themselves
as Croats and Orthodox as Serbs, with the Moslem segment listing themselves as of undeclared or Yugoslav nationality. I n the 1953 census, 85,000
Gypsies are listed; some authorities believe the actual number to be higher
since many are known to have declared themselves as Serbs or Macedonians.
There are many Serb and mixed Serb-Croat villages in Croatia despite
the massacre of local Serbs during the last war by the Fascist-led Ustashe,
composed of fanatic Croat nationalists. The Vojvodina, populated mainly
by Serbs and foreign minority groups, also has villages of Croat origin.
Since the war many Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and even Macedonians
have come to the area to occupy villages deserted by former German
inhabitants.
Unlike the prewar situation, many ethnic minorities are now officially
recognized, with elementary schools and sometimes high schools that use
their own language. On the university level, however, only Serbo-Croatian,
Slovene, and Macedonian are employed, causing special language situa-
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tions, such as that of an Albanian from Macedonia who attended a local
Albanian elementary school, went on to a Macedonian-speaking high
school, and finally to a Serbian university. Serbo-Croatian is the only language used in the army, so that male villagers of non-Serbo-Croatian groups
usually have some command of that language.
Each group has associated stereotypes: Serbs are emotionally untrustworthy but are outgoing and hospitable; Montenegrins are heroic, prefer
to direct rather than to work; Macedonians are backward but have wonderful music; Slovenes and Croats are clannish, unemotional, hardworking. Most resentment seems to be directed toward the Slovenes;
Slovenia is the most homogeneous republic, with the highest degree of industrialization and best standard of living in Yugoslavia.
Another point of division is based on differing historic traditions. Croats
and Slovenes tend to venerate their former association with central Europe
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and look down upon those "Balkan"
areas which were under Turkish rule. "Almost five hundred years under
the Turks" is often offered as the pat explanation for underdevelopment by
inhabitants of those areas which were part of the Ottoman Empire.
Despite the way in which urban construction has surrounded and grown
up within cities in former European and Turkish areas, gradually obliterating much of their former distinctiveness, the earlier flavor has not been
entirely eliminated from the urban scene. I n the old towns of Zagreb and
Ljubljana, church, castle, and town square strongly persist. Before the
1963 earthquake, in Skopje, Turkish tradition was apparent everywhere in
the old town, with its twisting cobbled streets, mosques, baths, and caravansary. I n Sarajevo much of this still remains. Parts of the old bazaar
have been preserved for the tourist trade, side by side with the monumental administrative buildings built later by the Austrians.
Table 2 shows how these legacies are manifested in the economic and
social structural distinctions among the republics. Differences have persisted from postwar years to the present. The proportion of salaried women
is notable. The Kosmet, with over 5 percent of the total population, has
only slightly more than 1 percent of such women, while in Slovenia the
figure is double their proportion in the total population. Similar disparities are reflected in the proportions of total salaried employment, number
of economic organizations and students, and the demographic data also
presented in Table 3. Generally the Kosmet is lowest or most underdeveloped in all indices while Slovenia is at the other end of the scale; Croatia
and Serbia are somewhat above the average, and the remaining republics
are under average, although the order varies with the index used.
Separating the developed from the underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia
is at best a complex business, and republic divisions only serve as a very
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general guide. A Yugoslav journalist's summary of this problem from a
semiofficial viewpoint is illuminating:
An uneven division of productive forces has been known to exist in this
country for a long period of time. The reasons can be found in the fact that
the economic and social life of the country existed only at the periphery of
imperial Austria and Turkey, and that this situation remained unchanged in
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This means that the situation of regional disproportion existed before and that it was imposed on the new society as a primary
factor determining further economic development. Though much has changed
lately and despite a complete change that came about in some areas, a pronounced imbalance is still present .We will probably not make a mistake if
we draw a line dividing relatively developed from relatively underdeveloped
territory . underdeveloped areas exist south of the Sava and Danube . the
Federal Social Plan 1961-65 labelled as underdeveloped: Macedonia, southern
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and one part of southern Croatia.
South of the line there are 8.7 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square kilometers,
while north of the line there are 28.2 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square
kilometers. In the south there are 13.5 enterprises per loo,ooo people, while
in the north there are 31.2. South of the line is 41 percent of the territory of
Yugoslavia and 6.3 million people whose national income is about 50 percent
smaller than that of the population living north of the line.10

..

..

..

Definition of Rural and Urban in the Yugoslav Context
Two aspects of the impact of industrialization in Yugoslavia are worth
noting: urbanization of the village, and its counterpart, peasantization of
the town. Such terms suggest the possibility of the emergence of a new,
more uniform national synthesis, one which would tend to minimize, if
indeed not eliminate, rural-urban differences. However, this problem has
several dimensions. Peasant life is being reformulated and, perhaps, for
certain pastoral groups even terminated, while urban life patterns are for
the most part only being modified.11
The peasant and the village are experiencing the most radical change,
although forces of industrialization and modernization broadly defined,
originating in the city, have, of course, altered the nature of urban life as
well. This is particularly striking in Yugoslavia, where traditional and contemporary sections of town often exist side by side in many larger centers
and also in smaller places like Maglaj. Urban life, encompassing a certain
amount of diversity, has been able to incorporate change, but in the village
change has impinged from without and is absorbed with greater difficulty
into existing patterns. Preindustrial cities which were craft or mining
centers have adjusted to industrialization more easily than towns which
functioned primarily as religious or even trade centers. Those rural areas
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which have had a craft tradition or cottage industry make the transition
more easily that those dependent exclusively on farming. There has been
a change from the days of the preindustrial city; the countryside has increasingly lost its autonomy and its ties with the past. I n contrast, urban
traditions are venerated, whether in universities, art galleries, or architectural monuments. T h e same cannot be said for rural material culture
and traditions; there are folk-dance groups and ethnographic museums,
but these are distinctly a matter of secondary importance.
I t is necessary to define the key terms "peasant," "village," "urban," and
"town" in the Yugoslav context. Without going into the cross-cultural
complexities, peasant life in Yugoslavia may reasonably be defined as a
subculture of which the essential feature is a tenitordally based relationship
among familial units, either extended or unclear, and the land they cultivate mainly with their own labor. This rel&onship has continuity through
time. The term also implies the association of these familial units in political, social, and economic units called villages. All members of this society need not practice agriculture as their primary occupation nor need
they reside continuously in the village, so long as their main social and
economic ties remain there. Migration of individuals or family groups is
possible from one peasant community to another. The peasant is also a
member of the national state, to which he must contribute services in labor,
in kind or in cash, and from which he receives, as a minimum, some form
of protection of his life and property against external and internal threats.
Obviously, the variation within this framework has been enormous, particularly in forms of familial organization, diversity of occupations subsidiary to agriculture, and the peasant-state relationship. The last ranges
from minimum regulation where the state requires only that its demand
for taxes, labor, and military service be met, to situations in which many
details of internal village organization and family relationships are centrally regulated.12
I n casual accounts of modernization, the temptation is to present a picture of the untouched village as contrasted with the dynamic town. But the
village has been the scene of enormous change. Obviously there is more
continuity with the past in areas where peasant families with small holdings have lived for generations than there is in a new industrial settlement.
Yet change is apparent. I n Serbia, for example, over a period of a century
and a half there has been a sequence of five distinct rural house types. Not
only do these house types reflect changing patterns of need, comfort, and
planning (the most recent follows a standardized plan devised by urban
architects and utilizes concrete and steel reinforcing rods), but they reflect
drastically altered ecological patterns, such as the virtual disappearance of
the forests in central Serbia.

I n the period 1951-1960, total dwelling space in rural areas rose by 11
percent. I n proportion to the number of inhabitants, housing construction
has grown even faster in the countryside than in towns. (In absolute terms,
however, it has progressed at a greater rate in urban communities. Since
1949, the urban population has increased by over two million while the
rural and farming population has decreased by about a half million).'s
Military service both during a war and in peacetime has been almost
universal. Because of the large number of army units based throughout
Yugoslavia, today as in prewar times most peasant recruits get the opportunity to see places remote from their homes. Since the units are often
mixed, the village youth meets young men from widely varying regions.
Few village men (in contrast to women) lack some degree of knowledge
beyond the confines of their own district. Those from poorer regions, particularly, become keenly aware of differences in living standards.
The peasant population incorporated a significant portion of the
ideology of the Partisan movement, even while resenting postwar attempts
at collectivization. The rural population has associated with or attributed
to this movement many of the changing aspects of life in the twentieth
century. A key case in point is the changed role of women. (Many women
were Partisans, most of them originally from towns, and village women
joined their ranks.) There is also anticlericalism, a feature present in the
Croatian peasant movement before the war but linked more closely with
the Partisans and their rejection of religion. These two attitudes provoked
hostility as well as covert acceptance. The most important new attitude,
however, is the very strong emphasis on industrialization as the pathway
to national salvation and a better way of life and, with this, the explicit
negation of village life. These sentiments are shared by village people
despite the negative self-images they invoke.
I n Yugoslavia, where so many people who dwell in the countryside work
outside their holdings, there is inevitably a certain degree of arbitrariness
in determining a household's main source of income. However, urban as
opposed to rural, or town as contrasted with village, implies a primarily
nonagricultural focus of economic activities and further, in contrast to the
rural pattern, greater occupational differentiation. I n addition, there is a
greater variety of ethnic groups than is usually found in the homogeneous
countryside. T h e town is also a center of trade, and of governmental, political, industrial, and religious activities. I t should be emphasized that
calling a particular community urban or rural conceals vast diversities.
Belgrade is urban, and so is Maglaj. The large, densely settled, prosperous
wheat-growing communities in the Vojvodina are rural as are isolated
pastoral communities scattered over the Montenegrin karst.
Table 4 clearly shows that size alone is not an indicator of urbanness in
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the traditional sense. T h e outstanding example is, of course, the Vojvodina, where almost half the population in the one town over l00.000 is
listed as agricultural, and almost a third in towns Erom 20,000-50,000 is
listed in the same category. This particular phenomenon dates back to the
time of the Turkish conquest when the agricultural population was clus
tered in large settlements for protection on the open plains. I t should be
noted that some of these larger communities have decreased in size in
recent years, because of administrative changes in boundaries, as a result
of which their agricultural sectors are now listed separately.14 Approximately one fifth of the population of towns from 20,000-50,000 in the
Kosmet and in Macedonia is listed as agricultural. I n all republics, at least
l o percent or more of the population of towns between lo,ooo and 20,000
is agricultural, two important exceptions being Slovenia, long under Austrian domination, with an old urban and industrial tradition, and Montenegro, at the other extreme, where no urban tradition existed until the
twentieth century.
Almost all the larger settlements have histories going back to Roman
times and progressing through the period of medieval kingdoms to the
Turkish conquest, when these towns were military garrisons, administrative centers, or the site of caravansaries on the important overland route
linking the Dalmatian Coast with Turkey. Some were mining centers, and
on the Dalmatian Coast a number of towns, notably Dubrovnik, became
important ports. Belgrade and Zagreb have long histories. Belgrade's population in the nineteenth century was significantly less than it had been
some centuries earlier. Before the nineteenth century, the rise and fall of
urban populations in the Balkans was a common phenomenon related to
the fortunes of war, epidemics, and changing trade patterns. The nineteenth century emergence of Serbia as a peasant state was a direct consequence of the withdrawal of the Turks and other ethnic groups who had
dominated the administrative and commercial life of the towns. Serbia's
lack of trained manpower and investment capital also resulted in her
general exclusion from the industrial revolution occurring throughout Europe during this period. T h e founder of the Serbian dynasty which ruled
Yugoslavia (with interruptions) until the Second World War was the famed
Karageorge, a prosperous livestock merchant from central Serbia who led
the first revolt against the Turks in 1804.
I n the late nineteenth century the territory now occupied by Yugoslavia
was almost entirely rural. Belgrade and Zagreb had only 15,000 people
(1867) and 20,000 (1869) respectively. Serbia remained very much a peasant
state up to the First World War, at which time almost go percent of the
republic's approximately g,ooo,ooo inhabitants were peasants. I n the few
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towns and in Belgrade itself, a significant proportion of the urban population were craftsmen oriented toward rural trade or produce merchants
involved in the sale or export of various agricultural products. Most of
these merchants and craftsmen were themselves of rural origin.
I n Serbia around the turn of the century, 126 separate crafts were practiced. These occupied over 33,000 craftsmen and almost 22,000 apprentices.l5 For 1900, a total of 3,200 "workers" is listed, a figure which increased
to 16,000 in 1910. Industrial enterprises were extremely small, employing
an average of 21 workers in lgoo and 34 in ~glo.'~
I n the late 19209s,for eighteen of the principal towns of Serbia (not
including Belgrade) with a total population of 247,000, the following were
listed: 4,361 stores; 4,127 craftsmen's shops; roo banking establishments;
and 142 industrial enterprises (the latter were given broad definition, including 51 flour mills, 18 brickyards, and 8 power plants), in addition to
the relatively small industries which were almost exclusively linked to agriculture and local consumption needs-breweries, food processing, textile
and shoe plants.l7
If it is assumed that each store or shop supported a family of five including the owner, and allowing in addition for one assistant or apprentice,
this accounts for more than 50,000 people or about one fifth the urban
population, leaving aside those employed in the banks and industrial concerns as well as administrators, civil servants, and the farmers who lived
within town limits.
The transformation has been drastic. The town of NiS, for example, in
1928 with a population of 38,000 had 500 stores and shops. I n 1963 the
population was almost 85,000, and 364 stores with 1,440 employees are
listed."-'
I n all republics, with the possible exception of Slovenia and certain
coastal towns, there are few townspeople who cannot trace a rural origin
two or, at most, three generations away. Urban population has grown as a
result of net migration as well as natural increase. During the prewar
period, for which two census years are available (1921 and 1931), natural
increase in the urban population is estimated at 242,000 and the net urban
migration in the same decade at 314,000. I n the first postwar census years
(1948 and 1953). natural increase amounted to 216,000 and net migration
to 430,000.'~
A notable characteristic of this migration is that the new workers frequently bring with them certain of their rural traits. This is vividly illustrated in the growing towns of central Serbia, a region given particular
industrial impetus since the war. I n addition to new urban construction, a
striking feature is the already large and increasing number of new private
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houses on the outskirts. Usually substantial brick and concrete structures,
they are identical inside and out to new houses one sees in villages. The
whitewashed kitchen, with its wood stove, remains the focal point of the
three- or four-room house. The kitchen invariably contains a bed covered
with a handloomed rug, used as a couch for visitors during the day and by
young children or an older relative for sleeping at night. A so-called guest
room, rarely used, is set aside for storage and display of choice items of
handiwork, and its walls are adorned with photographs of ancestors and
other relatives. There is no indoor plumbing, the water supply coming
from a well or, less often, from a shared outdoor tap. Chickens wander in
and out of the kitchen. I n the yard a pig may be kept, although recently
attempts have been made to ban pigs within town limits. Favorite village
flowers usually bloom in front of the dwelling, and behind it may be a
small vegetable garden and some young fruit trees.
Yugoslav investigators favor an economic explanation for this phenomenon because urban food supplies still tend to be somewhat irregular and
expensive. T o quote a prominent party member:
Much has been done to raise the general standard of living in our country,
but it seems there has been a lag in the standard of living of workers, especially
in the lower paid categories . In the middle of last year almost half of the
workers were receiving an income below 25,000 dinars; with these resources,
especially with an income below 20,000 dinars, it is difficult to meet needs in
food, clothing and shelter, and to maintain and educate a child with a children's
allowance, which has lost a great deal of its real value . . with present personal
incomes of workers in cities and industrial centers, those who do not have land
and a house are faring worst. About 70 to 75 percent of the family budget is
spent for food and shelter, and a family of a poorer paid worker spends about
85 percent of its income for these items. An increase in salaries, particularly in
the lower categories, can barely cover the rise in prices because the prices of
food and rent rise fastest. The higher paid categories can adjust to the jump
of prices by changing the structure of their consumption and they are less
sensitive to the increase.20

..
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Another view of the rural-urban shift appears in a survey conducted in
1960 by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. Industrial workers
with various qualifications in all parts of the country, a total of 5,012, were
studied. They worked in 255 different concerns, both large and small,
located in towns of various sizes, including enterprises in industry, mining,
construction, and public transportation. Relationships were established
between degree of skills, previous education, occupation of parents, and
amount of land held. Those who had worked in the village on their family
holdings before becoming workers, 39 percent of the total sample, composed 16 percent of the highly skilled workers, 27 percent of the skilled, 46
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percent of the semiskilled, and 55 percent of the unskilled workers. As
might be expected, the largest groups of highly skilled and skilled workers,
49 percent and 38 percent respectively, had some sort of formal technical
education. Significantly, the fathers of 3,085 of the workers surveyed were
farmers as opposed to 940 whose fathers were workers or craftsmen. T e n
percent of the 3,085 were highly skilled workers, and 24 percent were skilled
workers, as contrasted with 28 percent of the sons of workers who became
highly skilled workers and 31 percent who became skilled workers. These
figures indicate a problem of mobility for the sons of peasants. Those who
had attained the greatest skills had given up their association with the
land. Of the total workers surveyed, 55 percent owned no land at all, but
71 percent of the highly skilled workers and 60 percent of the skilled workers had no land as opposed to 52 percent of the semiskilled workers and 45
percent of the unskilled workers.2'
A very significant proportion of the white-collar class is also of peasant
origin. Of office workers with elementary schooling, 55 percent are from
villages, as are 32 percent of those with middle and higher schooling and
37 percent of executive personnel.22

Changing Social Relationships
I n discussing how village life is being reformulated and urban life modified
-and the significance of subsequent urbanization of the village and peasantization of the town-a number of important categories of change must
be considered. These include the nature and structure of social relationships within the household and the family and among household groups,
forms of political and economic organization beyond the kinship unit, and
their relationships to the ultimate unit, the national state; the physical and
material settings in which these groups operate are the values by which
people evaluate their situations.
An obvious bench mark against which to measure change in these categories is the line between the prewar and postwar periods. T o gain perspective, it is necessary to look back approximately a century before the
war, at which time urban life was, as has been shown, relatively little developed and the majority of the people in all areas were principally subsistence farmers.

T h e Zadruga and Kin Ties
With the exception of the Slovenes, whose cultural patterns more closely
approach those of the neighboring AustriansB than they do other Slav
groups, one can say that large kinship groupings have been and continue
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to be a very important feature of Yugoslav life. The term "zadruga" is
commonly applied to the extended family group of the South Slavs, although no simple definition can embrace all the varied manifestations of
this institution. I n Serbo-Croatian, it has two main meanings, the first
being "the joint family," and the second "cooperative enterprise." The
latter is commonly used today to refer to production and marketing units
among farmers or organizations of groups of craftsmen. The household
zadruga may be generally defined as a patrilineal and patrilocal extended
family functioning as a joint production and consumption unit. Importantly, it could also include members who were not related but were legally
or in some cases de facto adopted into the unit.24 Mosely has defined the
zadruga as "a household composed of two or more biological or smallfamilies, closely related by blood or adoption, owning its means of production communally, producing and consuming its means of livelihood
comm~nally."~~
Some scholars, particularly Tomasic, have attempted to distinguish between the type of zadruga found in the lowlands, especially Croatia, and
that of the Dinaric mountain herdsmen, as representing two contrasting
cultural types, the "Pannonian," with a democratic gospodar as household
Mosely outlines
chief, in contrast to the authoritarian "Dinaric" ~tareSina.~e
three regionally different types of zadrugas based on historical and ecological factors. The first consists of the tribal society of pre-igin Montenegro
and northern Albania, and the second, considerably larger, includes the
mountain systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Croatia, northern
and central Macedonia, and central Albania. The third belt runs ir
ly across the rolling plains and valleys of Croatia, the region of Slavonia,
pre-1912 Serbia, western and central Bulgaria, southern Macedorlia, and
,-".
southern Albania.27 He stresses the absence of ethnic or national alnerentiation in the structure and function of the varied types he studied and
was struck, for example, by the fact that Croat, Serb, and Moslem-Slav
zadrugas within a single area in Bosnia all showed essentially similar characteristics (aside from certain differences in religious customs and proper
names), suggesting that the zadrugal patterns are much older than the
religious and national traits, which developed s~bsequently.~~
This is
further corroborated by the existence in some places of Moslems and Christians in the same zadruga, the better to deal with changing governments.
By destroying the Serbian medieval state and especially the urban cornponent of the existing society, the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans $9erally helped perpetuate village-level institutions. I n periods of great
insecurity the large zadruga had many advantages as a unit of self-defense.
ed large
I n addition, the Ottoman practice of taxation by hearth t
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groupings.29 T h e zadruga was also functionally adapted to a mixed agricultural and herding economy and to the extensive pioneering efforts undertaken in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in central Serbia,
when the Serbs began to come out of their mountain refuges and settle on
the plains.
The zadruga organization was adapted for military purposes by the
Austrians on their border with Turkey in the area of Croatia-Slavonia.
Because the households were extended families, it was possible for ablebodied men to be spared for military service without endangering the
agricultural economy of the household. They received special privileges
for their service, including local self-government and freedom from taxation as well as religious toleration (they were mainly Orthodox). For a
time, they also had the right to the spoils of war. Generally speaking their
status was superior to that of serfs who were under the domination of the
landowners. The people inhabiting the frontier were organized into units
which bore direct allegiance to the emperor. Their homesteads were considered inalienable since they could not be sold or mortgaged.30
Literature on the zadruga among rural groups is relatively abundant,
and the large size it attained is well documented. Even today, groups of
twenty and over can be found in parts of Bosnia, Macedonia, and the
Kosmet. Before the war, household units of sixty or more members were
by no means rare in many parts of the country. For urban groups there is
less information, although it appears quite certain that prosperous Serbian
merchants and craftsmen in towns maintained large households.
Family commercial enterprises among Orthodox groups have a successful
history in the Balkans. The major reason for this was the solidarity of kin
ties, consanguineal, affinal, or artifically extended.

-

Their businesses were often family aEairs, with one member of the family
in the Balkans, another in Austria, Italy, or the Netherlands, and a third in
Russia, Egypt, or France. Carrying on business as a family affair allowed them
to make a more economic employment of labor by the avoidance of expensive
middlemen or brokers, to which European merchants had to resort. Religious
and ethnic ties, brotherhood or pobratimstvo held together these partners or
associates who were not of the same biological family.31
9

The basic social patterns of these urban merchants were derived from
the rural areas from which they had originated a generation or more
previously.
I n the usual type of zadruga were the household elder and his wife and
one or more sons with their families. The power of the stardina here was
obviously great, since it was that of a father over his sons and not that of
an individual selected by general agreement on the basis of his personal
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qualifications. The father's position was founded on one of the cardinal
principles of behavior in traditional Serbian society, i.e. obedience toward
one's elders, particularly the males and especially the father. T h e head of
the household was expected to (and usually did) consult with the sons on
important matters, and a son could replace his father if the latter became
incapacitated for one reason or another. I n this case, it was usually the
eldest brother who took over.
Formal respect for the head of the household and older males in general
was shown in many ways. For example, when a young boy or even a young
adult met an older man he would take off his hat and say "Good day."
Older people, even within the same household, were always addressed in
the formal Vi form. A new daughter-in-law had to wash the feet of the
male elders at the end of each day's work. When a starGina entered the
home of a neighbor or friend the children and young adults of that household kissed his hand as a sign of respect. The head of the household regarded these acts as his due, and if anyone failed in his duties toward him
there were often serious consequences. Despite the cultural norms there
were some household heads who were dominated by their wives. PapuZar
(slipper-wearer)is the Serbo-Croat term for henpecked.
Women in peasant households played a very significant role, in contrast
to their position in town families where their economic functions were
decidedly secondary. The wife of the head of the zadruga planned and
assigned special women's tasks, coordinating all women's work within the
household. A Serbian folk saying declares that within the house the woman
is the head and the man the guest. While the wife always publicly deferred
to her husband, this does not mean she was never consulted or that her
influence on her husband was negligible. Marriage was in a real sense regarded as a partnership, although overlain with a formal inequality. One
old villager reflected this attitude in describing how he progressed from a
humble peasant to become head of a large and prosperous household, concluding, "And all this I have achieved with my baba."
The evidence is not conclusive, but it may be that prosperous village
households in the nineteenth century had patterns similar to those of the
families of town merchants (the role of women being an important difference), and perhaps the poorer urban families and the impoverished village
families had more overt equality in the relationships within the household.
I n the eastern and southern areas, town merchants did, of course, attempt
to emulate their Turkish counterparts.
T h e process of modernization has greatly altered the traditional structure of the patriarchal household in the town as well as the village. I n
OraSac, the average household size declined consistently from 8.3 individu-
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als in 1844 to 6.9 in 1890 to 4.5 in 1953. I n the nearby market town of
Arandjelovac, household size dropped from 4.6 in 1890 to 2.9 in 1953.32
This trend continues, not only for villages in Serbia but in all parts of
Yugoslavia. Table 5 points u p the differences in average household size
by republics and by size of community, using 1953-1961 census data. For
1953, the largest average household size, 5.78, occurs in the smallest settlements in Macedonia, and the smallest households, 2.78 people, are found
in the largest centers of Slovenia. When comparing these figures with those
from 1961, we find that average household size in the large towns has barely
altered; while for the smallest settlements, average size has decreased by
0.34 persons per household. Significantly, the two ends of the continuum,
Slovenia and the Kosmet, have changed least. The largest unit, Serbia
proper, has decreased most (by 0.5 persons), followed by Bosnia (0.34 persons), reflecting the impact of industrialization on these two areas.
Table 6 shows Yugoslav households by number of members in the years
I 948, I 953, and I 96 I. The number with five or more members has remained
stationary or declined progressively in proportion to the total number of
households while those with under four members have correspondingly
increased. I n terms of frequency distribution, the largest number of households are those with three to four members. However, if viewed in terms
of the total population, it is apparent that the large household remains a
significant factor in Yugoslav society despite the century-long decline of
the classic zadruga. Of course, the decline in population in some categories
is also marked, considering the general population increase. I n 1953, there
were 546,000 people living in households of ten members and in I 96 I only
420,000 in this category, representing a decline of more than 20 percent
(yet the later figure is almost that of Yugoslavia's second largest city).
Some observers have been satisfied to explain the decline of the zadruga
and associated diminution of patriarchal authority as a consequence of
modernization, but modernization involves more than the gradual disap
pearance of preexisting patterns. Often the patterns are reformulated,
certain ones becoming intensified and others taking on different functions.
With specific reference to the zadruga, today the smaller household units
often work harder i n many respects than formerly, since there is less specialization and increasing overlap in what used to be a fairly strict division
of labor between the sexes. When the head of the household is a peasantworker, his wife's responsibilities become extremely burdensome. I t is often
only with difficulty that she can assist with agricultural chores, attend to
regular housework and cooking, and, in addition, mind her young children, a task formerly assumed by their grandmother. If, however, neighbors are also kin (indeed they are often originally from the same zadruga)
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and if relations are amicable, they may continue to cooperate closely.
Kinship ties continue to play a very important role in migrations to cities
and towns in most parts of the country. A classic form has been the pupil
who continues his education beyond the village elementary school by going
to live with relatives in town. His family supplies him with food and often
gives extra amounts as informal payment for the child's lodging. I n the
prewar period, he might have been apprenticed to a craftsman who, as
often as not, was related to the family, if only indirectly. Under present
conditions, a job in a factory can sometimes be obtained through a relative.
This, of course, is not done directly, but is a case where the concept of veze,
literally connections, is pertinent. There is some indication that the institution of workers' councils, which stress local management, encourages this
practice, although nepotism, as such, is formally opposed by political organizations and administrators. Kin ties appear to be less significant for
professionals or where the place of employment is far removed from one's
point of origin, e.g. for a Serb working in Macedonia. However, these ties
can be extremely important for the villager who moves to the nearby
market town or even to the provincial capital. Not infrequently, he retains
his land in the village and receives informal rent in the form of food which
a village relative brings to him in town. He may also return to the village
to help with the crops during his vacation. By the same token, when a villager has business in town, he will almost always stay with his relatives, even
though it may be for a prolonged period. These kin ties with the village
are, of course, not indissoluble and frequently do weaken over the generations, but they seldom disappear within the course of a single generation or
even two.
Ideally, help is expected from patrilineal kin and often from godparents
(kumovi) as well. Such artificially extended kin ties persist even among
people who are not formally religious. Their preservation is aided by the
fact that Yugoslavia is a relatively small country and that most movement
occurs within republics or to neighboring republics. Permanent moves
from one end of the country to the other are extremely rare, as the nationality distribution of the population shows, e.g. few Slovenes immigrate to
Macedonia or vice versa, or even Montenegrins to Croatia:s but there is
considerable movement between Bosnia and Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia,
Montenegro and Macedonia.
Where there were major population movements, as in the settlement of
many Montenegrins and Bosnians in the lands left by the Germans after
the war, migration was generally by family groups. Many of these people
were subsequently employed in industrial enterprises of various sorts.
Other than temporary migrations by workers, the most significant postwar
population movements are the continuing movement of agricultural
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colonists to the Vojvodina and, in much smaller numbers, technicians from
Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia to developing industrial sites in other areas.
Factors in the Decline of the Family
I n considering changes in the family and zadruga, the role of the woman
is extremely important. A principal reason for breakdown within zadrugas
has been conflicts among the in-marrying women. This is easily understandable since the males are related consanguineally while the women
have only their single affinal bond and, subsequently, their tie to their
children, which is often in direct conflict with a father-son or sibling relationship. A frequent source of trouble was hostilities resulting from differences in dowries, especially in land, that brides brought to the zadruga
household. Another factor of great importance is the changing legal position of women reinforced by improved education, which makes it more
likely that they will attempt to exercise those rights granted to them in the
postwar constitution.
A Yugoslav scholar has described the formal legal changes in the status of
women.

. ..

Till 1945 there were
three main legal systems: the former Austrian Civil
Code from 1811 (with different amendments), the Serbian Civil Code from
1858, and Moslem religious law.
According to these systems, the husband was proclaimed legal head of the
family. He directs the household, wields alone parental powers, selects the
residence of the family; the wife takes her husband's name, obeys his orders,
the husband is presumed to be the manager of his wife's possessions and is
legally not responsible to her for his management, possessions acquired during
marriage belong to the husband if not expressly stipulated otherwise, in case
of death of the father the mother cannot be the legal guardian of her children.
The new legal system has emphatically proclaimed the equality of women in
all walks of life. . . Husband and wife have the legal duty of mutual help and
support. Questions of the household and of family-management are settled by
agreement. Possessions acquired by economic activity of husband or wife during
the marriage are [in] common ownership, possessions brought into the marriage
or otherwise acquired (inheritance, etc.) belong to the partner who brought or
acquired them. The wife is free to retain her maiden family name, or use both,
or take the husband's. The mother has equal parental rights with the father.
In case of death of the father she is the legal guardian of the children.84

.

I n addition to legal changes, the status of women as wage earners has
altered. Between 1952 and 1959, the percentage of employed women between the ages of 15 and 60 doubled, to 14 percent, and women constituted
about one quarter of the nonagricultural labor force (excluding agriculture
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and handicrafts). T h e percentage of working wives increased from 18 percent in 1953 to 23 percent in 1959.95 During the period 1956-1963, the
number of employed women grew to a proportionately greater extent than
did the total labor force. This is particularly striking in the more traditiontied areas such as Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.
I n a textile mill in Macedonia in an area where working wives coped
with time-consuming household chores and lack of adequate child-care
facilities, the workers' council formed a commission to find out how female
employees spent their leisure time. Of the thirty women included in the
inquiry, only one was found resting when visited by the commission. The
others were busy cooking, cleaning, or doing laundry. I n order to assist
women workers, working collectives opened workers' restaurants to sell
prepared food at lower prices. T h e report concludes, however, that much
more remains to be done to free women to develop their labor potential.
One of the most urgent problems is the care of children while mothers are
at work.38
The changing status of women is also evident in their mobility through
marriage. They continue to remain disadvantaged in education, but marriage does offer a way to leave the village or become involved in a nonagricultural household. A survey conducted during 1956-1958 found that
although 98 percent of farmers married women with a similar background,
only 75 percent of the peasant girls married villagers engaged in agriculture; 6 percent married skilled workmen and craftsmen, and others married
white-collar employees.37 Although peasant women are in general more
mobile than men, it should be noted that their individual potentiality is
less. For example, the chances of a peasant's sdn obtaining a university
education are greater than those of a peasant's daughter.
Many of the strains within the nuclear family and in extended family
and kin relationships can be traced to the great value attached to education and the generally lower educational level of adults compared with
children, women with men, and rural inhabitants contrasted with town
dwellers. T h e general level of education of mothers is considerably below
that of fathers, and figures from the 1953 census show that the average
education of the family head is below the national average. In 56 percent
of families, wives have no schooling, while an additional 35 percent have
been only to elementary school. Further, a significant number of younger
people who have a secondary or higher education have only now begun to
found families38 Generally they many late and have few children, the
pattern resembling that of the American middle class during the thirties.
This is in part due to the severe apartment shortage in urban areas.
When a child of a peasant family attains more than an elementary school
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education, this usually implies that he has left the village and, by extension,
has adopted a completely new cultural pattern. This is almost universally
the case in the eastern and southern parts of Yugoslavia. Significantly, parents, who often must make great sacrifices to get their children out of the
village, are frequently treated in a harsh and condescending way by their
children who have become self-conscious about their humble origins. Parents often support children who are students until they are well into their
twenties, sending cash, parcels of food, or both. Although the children of
civil servants and skilled workers are much more highly represented in
the gymnasia (the high schools which lead to the universities), many children of peasants enter vocational schools, teacher training schools, and
agricultural institutes. As a number of Yugoslav investigators have pointed
out, the great social transition is from an agricultural to a nonagricultural
occupational pattern. Transitions from manual to nonmanual and higherstatus occupations are easier with respect to family life. Family ties are
strained the most in the transition from agricultural to nonagricultural
occupations, when one's childhood background must be explicitly rejected.
Someone entering government service or a socially owned enterprise must
put aside not only the pattern of traditional beliefs and practices associated
with village life, but also the point of view of the individual peasant
entrepreneur in a socialist state.
Despite the enhanced formal status of women in postwar Yugoslavia,
traditional attitudes about women on the part of urban people have by no
means disappeared. These are reinforced by the fact that the schooling of
the wife has lagged significantly behind that of her husband, a pattern
which has continued up to the present. Of couples marrying in 1962, in
those cases where the husband had elementary schooling, approximately
20 percent of the wives had no schooling, while where the husband had
some degree of middle schooling (eighth grade or better) 44 percent of the
wives had elementary schooling or less; among those with university or
higher education, only about 28 percent of the wives matched their husband's education. Significantly, only among men with no schooling were
approximately one third of the wives better educated, while where the men
had an elementary school education the percentage of better-educated
wives fell to 6 percent and to 2 percent in cases where the husband had
some degree of middle schooling. T h e greatest educational inferiority
among women is found where men have had elementary school or university-level education. These statistics appear to indicate that the highest
approach to equality in educational background is precisely among the
group from which the greatest number of working wives is drawn. Those
wives who have no schooling or only an elementary education can be as-
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sumed to be in the main either the wives of private farmers or peasantworkers and occupied with their tasks at home and on the land (two thirds
of all women marrying), while the female labor force possessing some degree of skill is increasingly being drawn from the middle group. That is,
the working wife who has the best chance of approaching her husband's
educational status and earning power is from this group, since those cases
where both husband and wife are professionals form a very small proportion of the labor force. This group is, of course, very significantly different
from the population as a whole, with the educational gap significantly
narrowed. Age at marriage, however, continues to be younger for women
than for their husbands (in 1962 70 percent of the women and only 45
percent of the men were age 25 or under at the time of marriage).39
Milovan Djilas i n his critical essays on the Yugoslav elite wrote on the
problems which great social mobility imposed on the wives of high government officials. T h e husbands had entered the wide world of international politics while the wives remained tied to traditional family interests.
Their inability to make the transition resulted in a number of divorces.
Statistics show that such problems occur commonly. Among those seeking
divorce in 1962 the men averaged more years of education than the womenP0 Although agriculturalists compose by far the largest occupational
group (about four times the number of industrial workers, according to
the 1961 census) the number of workers involved in divorce proceedings
(according to the occupation of the husband) is about 2 0 percent higher
than among agriculturalists. Divorces among professional people are one
third the number of those among agriculturalists even though their absolute numbers in the population are but a small fraction of the latter.
Divorce rates are lowest in the least developed areas; for example the rate
per thousand is 1.5 for Serbia, 0.4 for the Kosmet, and 0.6 for MacedoniaP1
I t seems logical to infer that the greatest transformations in family
relationships are occurring among rural migrants with some degree of
education above the elementary level. One might add that these transformations are occurring in areas where opportunities for nonagricultural
employment are greatest, in towns and particularly in the more rapidly
developing republics such as Serbia, with burgeoning Belgrade as a prime
example.
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An Overuiew of Modernization

& Illustrated by Primers

I n viewing the process of modernization, the foreign observer is looking
in from the outside. However, the outsider has the advantage of a detached viewpoint and the possibility of seeing overall patterns. At the same
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time, it is crucial to know what are the ideals of the culture with respect
to change as seen by those on the inside. One important aspect of this is
the indoctrination of youth. As an interesting means of depicting the
modernization process, the following section surveys first-grade primers
used in the different republics during the years 1952 to 1964. These primers
were all produced locally. The life styles depicted vary, as do the teaching
techniques, the illustrative material, and the quality of the books themselves, but they all have a common ideology. T h e lessons are obviously
limited by the pedagogical considerations in introducing reading and
writing to first graders, but they illustrate well the ideal behavior patterns
and official values. This analysis will concentrate on visual materials, primarily from a qualitative point of view. This, too, naturally has limitations,
representing as it does local adults' attempts to present the lessons in a
manner meaningful to seven-year-olds and at the same time socially and
politically approved. I t is possible to see, however, the nature of the world
to which the children are being introduced.
I n all of the primers dating from the 19509s,the period of consolidation
of the national state, national identification is presented in the form of a
frontispiece photograph of Tito, invariably in the uniform of marshal of
the Yugoslav armed forces. I n most of the photographs he is stern and unsmiling, the classic picture of an authoritarian figure. By the 1960's he is
more often pictured in civilian dress, still the essence of solidity and leadership, but definitely more benign. A theme which has become predominant
in the later readers is that of Tito entertaining children. I n the 1964 primer
for Croatia, his photograph has been omitted entirely, while the most
recent primer from Slovenia, a republic felt to be more conservative politically, presents a line drawing of Tito as a Partisan. Characteristically, the
Albanian primer, printed by a special publishing house in Belgrade for use
in the Kosmet and parts of Macedonia, continues the stern-faced marshal
unaltered. T h e earlier books contain plentiful references to the Partisan
struggle and the role of children as young pioneers helping to build socialism. For example, the 1952 primer for Serbia contains the text of a song
honoring Tito as the wartime savior of the country, and following pages
include illustrated stories of young boys and girls working to build canals
and railroads and a picture of a Partisan leader who died a heroic death.
Youth construction activities continue to appear in the 1964 edition, now
focusing on road-building, with a sketch of young workers welcoming Tito
to the road on which they have worked. I n another picture, children celebrate Army Day, with the captions "Long Live the Yugoslav Army!" and
"Long Live Comrade Tito!" Significant is a picture of children playing
war, the moral of the text being defense of one's homeland. T h e closest
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the Croatian reader comes to this type of theme is a picture of children
visiting a warship which travels to many places. Here the text concludes
"Long Live our Sai7orsl" The 1961 Slovene reader has several lessons using
the Partisans, Tito, patriotic holidays, and even a story about a young man
going off to army service, but no mention of youth construction projects
(Croatia and Slovenia being the two most developed republics).
Since the historic traditions of each area are significantly different and
since the Yugoslav Communist movement developed principally during the
war, it is understandable that patriotic references should be focused on the
person of Tito and subsidiary heroes of the resistance period. (It should
be mentioned that in later grades the children do study figures connected
with individual literary traditions; for example Slovene pupils learn about
their nineteenth-centurynationalist poet PreSeren, and Serbian and Montenegrin children study their important nationalistic literary figures Vuk
KaradiiE and the poet-prince NjegoS.)
All the primers stress themes of economic development. The emphasis is
on constructive activity-building factories, mechanizing the countrysideas opposed to recreation. The value of play is introduced only in connection with specific institutionalized holidays: young pioneers go on an
outing to celebrate on the First of May; children dance around a decorated
New Year's Tree (these are the state substitutions for Easter and Christmas)P2
In keeping with the emphasis on economic development the father is
usually pictured as an industrial worker and, reflecting the increasingly
common situation, he is shown returning to his home in a rural setting,
implicitly a village. Many pictures of factories show wheat or other crops
being harvested in nearby fields.
All household activity is purposeful. Children, boys especially, are shown
studying. Girls study or help with the cooking. Mother is always shown
cooking, cleaning, or knitting, and Father typically reads a newspaper.
A common motif throughout all the books for all years is the family
grouped around a table, the father reading, children doing their lessons,
and the mother knitting. There is also a strong emphasis on personal hygiene. Cleanliness and literacy are part of the East European concept of
kultur, so that people who are kulturni are not necessarily those with a
refined education but individuals who are clean and can read. Invariably
the verb "to wash oneself' is worked into.the lesson. There may be sound
linguistic reasons for this but water pitchers and basins frequently appear
in the pictures. A c o q o n theme is proper treatment of illness, exemplified by consultation with a doctor and use of bottled medicine. All of
which serves to emphasize the stress placed on hygiene.
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The consistent emphasis on the value of literacy is not surprising. In
some peasant homes in less advanced parts of the country, the small child
with his primer is the first member of the household to have formal schooling. In most cases where the village parents have had minimal schooling,
the child's education opens a path of mobility which will eventually enable
him to work outside the village. Schooling is regarded not as an ordinary
part of childhood but as a tool to be used to bring about a better life.
Another example of valued behavior is equality of the sexes. Men and
women are pictured working side by side in the factory and participating
in heavy construction work in rural areas. Boys and girls work together in
school and on youth construction projects.
Relatively little space (with the marked exception of the Albanian readers) is devoted to anthropomorphic animal stories, and, of course, there are
no tales of kings or beautiful princesses. In most cases, the emphasis is unswervingly on realism. Homes are shown with an occasional crack in the
wall. People doing hard work wear old clothes, sometimes patched. In the
illustrated alphabet sections of some of the primers, along with fruits, toys,
farm equipment, and household items, familiar objects selected to exemplify sounds include rat, wasp, and snout.
The earlier primers place no emphasis on clothing as such, other than
as being part of a generally neat appearance. (An interesting note, however, is that the teacher is always shown wearing a tie.) A decade later there
is definite stress on clothing and accessories, on getting dressed up for some
special event, and on grooming that appears to exceed the good health
habits classification. Wristwatches frequently appear. In the 1963 reader
for Bosnia, an impeccably dressed father and son set out to visit a relative,
presumably in the village. On the opposite page, a man goes hunting
dressed in fashionable sports attire, complete with special hat and hunting
jacket.
The style of illustrations has improved over the years from generally
crude, static representations to bright, sharp, often imaginatively rendered
drawings. Quality aside, the illustrations offer an excellent opportunity for
a comparison of idealized standards of living. For example, one lesson
shows an interior scene of grandparents listening to their grandson read
from his primer. In the 1952 Serbian book, all three are seated on low
stools against a vague background. Eleven years later, Grandfather, putting down his newspaper, sits back in a big easy chair; Grandmother, still
with her knitting, sits in a chair with a back. The room contains a modern
cabinet with a shelf of books, and a bright rug on the floor completes the
picture.
Apparent in most recent editions are significant signs of transition to a
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stage of assured industrial development. I n most of the new books, earlier
themes of socialist construction and Partisan offensiveshave been replaced
by scenes of consumption of goods and even of leisure. There has been an
increase in animal stories, and the new Bosnian reader actually contains
a fairy tale. I n the earlier books, the village is depicted as the place where
most children live. In recent ones, it is shown more and more as the place
where one goes to visit older relatives or to hunt and fish. The newer books
have unquestionably become more urban-oriented.
Of course, significant differences among the republics remain. Selfimages and views of each other are important. For example, in the 1964
Croatian book, the Serbo-Croatian consonant form dE, found in many
nouns of Turkish origin, is illustrated by a picture and text about "our
good friends in Bosnia," two boys whose names start with this sound. A
typical Bosnian Moslem village scene is depicted, with the mother dressed
in full baggy trousers and with steep-roofed Moslem village houses in the
background. It is interesting that in the Bosnian book, the same sound is
introduced by the noncommital word "diak," or sack, and that nowhere
throughout this reader is there any hint of the differences among the three
major ethnic-religious groups who live in Bosnia.
The primers mirror an impressive degree of economic development and
considerable intellectual liberalization, which has enabled them to emerge
both artistically and in content from their earlier sterile socialist realism.
Despite these definite trends, however, even the more recent readers, when
compared with the fun-and-games-in-suburbiaapproach of so many American primers, remain serious and ideologically oriented.
Modernization is a continuing process of adaptation to an ever-evolving
technology, as inhabitants of the most developed industrial states have
discovered. In Yugoslavia its impact on various age, sex, nationality, and
occupational groups has been uneven. Some generalizations are possible,
however. The most dramatic transformations in the initial phases of industrialization are taking place among present villagers and those who
have left the village. Traditional peasant methods of cultivation sanctioned
by the yearly round of ceremonies and individual small-scale marketing at
weekly town fairs are, in the long run, manifestly incompatible with modern technology and the increasing consumer demands of expanding urban
centers. Undoubtedly, as the rural-urban transition progresses, the focus
will be on the town as the primary arena of change. The reformulation of
village life and peasant subculture has just begun to make its impact on
the more conservative town. Toward the end of the century, we will no
doubt be seeing a further stage in the process of modernization (or perhaps
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by then the term will have become obsolete). Once initiated into life in
town, without firm ties to a historic tradition, the ex-peasant will begin to
influence even more profoundly the nature of traditional urban life. Previously, when the influx was smaller, it was possible to incorporate the
ex-villager into the professional occupations and urban trades when he
modified his manners, speech, and values to accord with those of the dominant classes. But tomorww and even today this is no longer practicable;
values are changing, and those which exist are set by mass education and
the mass media. The Yugoslav revolution introduced a new ideology, but
it is only a minority who have developed a strong ideological commitment
as opposed to a career commitment. Increased and diversified consumer
goods and associated living standards still are significant aspirations for a
good proportion of the urban population, whether it is a question of securing an adequate apartment, a car, or an education for one's children.
Beyond this, there is the question of what distinctive features will characterize the process of modernization in Yugoslavia. One of these appears
to be decentralization, a result of historical patterns of population distribution as much as of conscious planning.
Exactly how the question of ethnic diversity will be manifested in urban
life is difficult to predict. Ethnic rivalries will doubtless continue, but they
may well develop more in the direction of competing regional economic
interest groups than specific socioeconomic groups having particular subcultural identities. A prime example is the Serb-Croat relationship. The
prewar program of the Croatian Peasant Party is largely irrelevant in terms
of today's industrialization. I t is no longer a question of making rural life
more attractive as a solution to Yugoslavia's nationality problem. Much
more important, considering the actual and potential surplus of labor in
the countryside and, to a lesser extent, in the town, is the problem of maintaining channels of mobility so that increasingly greater segments of the
population will be able to enjoy the fruits of industrialization. There is
already ample evidence of this economic conflict in the allocation of finite
resources for the construction of factories and apartment houses. With so
few young people visualizing a future on the land or in the village, this
problem may become acute. Doubtless certain subcultural differences will
persist in interpersonal relationships and, to some extent, in general value
systems, but by and large these are subordinate to modern technological
imperatives. One can observe great diversity in peasant housing, costumes,
customs, language, and family structure from village to village. These differences have developed over long periods of time. A modern city, even
one with well-developed historic traditions, does not foster such diversification. A new settlement of urban workers in Zagreb or Belgrade may have

TABLE
1
Private Agricultural Households
By Number, Size, and Occupation of Members, 1960
to .I .l to .5 .5 to 1

Size of Holdings (in Hectares)
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5

5-8
8-10 Over lo*
Number of Holdings
(in 000)
Agricultural
Mixed
Othert
Area
(in 000 hectares)
Agricultural
Mixed
Other
Population on Holdings
(in 000)
All agriculturalists
Male agriculturalists
Employed outside holding
Private holdings are limited by law to l o hectares except when some is in woods or pastures or when households are exceptionally large.
t Mainly households with gardens, the produce of which is not marketed.
Source: Statistitki goditnjak SFR], 1964. godina XI. p. 164.
Total

Some Economic and Social Indicators, by Republic
Serbia
Population
(in 000) (1961)
Salaried pop.
(in 000) (1962)
Salaried women
(in 000) (1962)
Economic
organizations (196 1)
Apartments
(in 000) (1961)
Elementary school
pupils (in 000)
(1961-62)
Students completing
university in 1962
Suicides
(1961)
.
.

No.

%
No.

%
No.

%
No.

%
No.

%
No.

%
No.

%
No.

%

Serbia
Proper* Vojvodina* Kosmet*

7,642
41.2
1,300
37.8
355
35.5
6,923
35.0
554
41.7
1,165

4,823
26.0
792
23.1
214
21.4
3,965
20.0
333
25.1
617

1,853
10.0
428
12.4
129
12.9
2,528
12.8
190
14.3
280

40.2
12,339
53.9
924
42

24.8
11,135
48.6
502
22

9.7
1,003
4.4
384
17

Bosnia and
MonteCroatia Herzegovina Slovenia Macedonia negro Yugoslavia

Included in total for Serbia.
Sources: Statistical Pocketbook of Yugoslavia, 1963, p. 23. Statistitki godisnjak SIiRJ, 1,963,pp. 350, 351,364, 472. 474,479,346.
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Changes in Average Household Size from 1953 to 1961,
By Size of Settlements and Republics
Size of Settlements

Republic

2,0002,999
1953 1961

3,0004,999
1953 1961

5,0009,999
1953 1961

10,00019,999
1953 1961

20,00029,999
1953 1961

30,00049,999
1953 1961

Serbia proper
Vojvodina
Kosmet

4.59 -.5
3.83 - 2 7
5.47 +.06

4.23 - 3 7
3.84 - 3 1
5.67 -.02

3.92 - 3 5
3.61 -.23
5.45 +.I2

3.18 -.03
3.34 -.14
4.88 -.I2

3.17
.O
3.03 -.l
4.71 +.08

3.39 -.01
3.13 -.09
4.27 -.07

-

Croatia

3.84 -.21

3.47 -.13

3.17 +.03

3.22 -.08

3.05 +.03

2.92 -.07

2.84 -.01

Slovenia

3.15+.02

3.11 -.09

2.86 +.06

3.05 -.24

2.84 +.04

-

-

2.78

+ .I

Bosnia a n d
Herzegovina

5.08 - 3 4

4.40 -.44

3.68 -.01

3.91 -.07

-

-

3.32

- .03

3.40

- .17

Macedonia

5.78 -.07

4.99 -.45

4.23 +.03

4.22 +.I3

4.17 -.02

3.99

.O

Montenegro*
All Yugoslavia

3.76
-31
4.39 - 3 4

+

+

2.94
.26
3.63 +.03

+

3.70
.2
3.58 -.I3

+

3.80
.18
3.44 +.I4

3.43 -.02
3.34 +.01

50,000
a n d over

1953 1961
2.92 -.I4
2.83 -.06

-

3.91 +.11

- - - 3.35 -.04

2.96 -.06

In Montenegro the increases are due to strong patriarchal tradition, a high rate of natural increase, and the fact that this republic has
the fewest urban centers, in size and number, in all Yugoslavia.
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade.

Yugoslav Households, by Number of Members
Year
1948

No.

%
1953

No.

1961

No.

%

Total
Households

1

2

3

3,609,725

451,184

509,353

560,937

12.5

14.1

15.5

480,203

566.936

677,420

100.0
3,945,287
100.0
4,648,563

12.2

14.4

16.4

630,128

715,283

801,257

4

Number of Members
5
6
7

574,994 492,780

372,337

250,987

'13.7

10.3

7.0

665,011 537,189

396,029

259,509

15.9
16.9

11
10

and over

156,855 93,418
4.3
2.6

53,703
1.5

93,177
2.6

158,076

54,592

87,028

8

9

93,294

13.6

10.0

6.6

4.0

2.4

1.3

2.2

865,821 635,553

428,576

249,424

137,281

75,295

41,959

67,986

9.2

5.4

3.0

1.6

.8

1.5

%
100.0
13.6
15.4
17.2
Source: StatistiEki godifnjak SFRJ, 1964,Table 108-5, p. 85.
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